The incentive compatible core of an economy with differential information: the quasi-linear case
by
Françoise Forges
THEMA, Université de Cergy-Pontoise
Coauthors: Jean-François Mertens (CORE), Rajiv Vohra (Brown University)

In a differential information economy with quasi-linear utilities, monetary transfers facilitate the fulfillment of incentive compatibility constraints. Under suitable assumptions (e.g., independent private values), we show that the associated ex-ante incentive compatible core is non-empty. However, we exhibit a well-behaved exchange economy in which this core is empty, even if goods are allocated through random mechanisms.

Date received: April 25, 2000

Copyright © 2000 by the author(s). The author(s) of this document and the organizers of the conference have granted their consent to include this abstract in Atlas Conferences Inc. Document # caez-45.