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How many veiled women can we expect in Cairo? Characterization of equilibria in large anonymous games
by
Matthias Blonski
University of Mannheim, Germany
Islamic fundamentalists and their secular opponents recognize that the decision of women to cover their head in public generates social pressures to conform on those wishing to remain unveiled. This article identifies the essence of social coordination problems generated by this type of externalities in terms of large anonymous games. The main result is a general characterization result that reveals the structure of equilibria. In particular, various levels of veiling can be interpreted as different equilibria of the same anonymous game.
http://www.vwl.uni-mannheim.de/stahl/stahl.htm
Date received: April 27, 2000
Copyright © 2000 by the author(s). The author(s) of this document and the organizers of the conference have granted their consent to include this abstract in Atlas Conferences Inc. Document # caez-70.