Stable Syndicates of Factor Owners and Distribution of Social Output
by
Hélène Ferrer
GEMMA-University of Caen

The purpose of this paper is to examine the stability of syndicates of factor owners in a productive economy when the allocation of production is governed by the Shapley value. We consider an economy in which a single output is produced by an increasing returns to scale production function using two inputs: labor and capital. By assuming that syndicates of factor owners can form, we are interested in their stability, i.e., the willingness of the members of the syndicate to stay in the syndicate. Our analysis, based on the Shapley value, allows us to find a fair imputation of the gains of cooperation and the conditions under which syndicates are stable.

Date received: April 29, 2000

Copyright © 2000 by the author(s). The author(s) of this document and the organizers of the conference have granted their consent to include this abstract in Atlas Conferences Inc. Document # caez-84.