Stochastic games with non-observable actions
by
Janos Flesch
Department of Mathematics, Maastricht University, The Netherlands
Coauthors: Frank Thuijsman (Maastricht University), Koos Vrieze (Maastricht University)

We consider n-player average reward stochastic games in which the players do not observe the actions of the opponents. Two cases will be examined. In the first case it is assumed that each player can only observe his own actions and payoffs (and the current state), while in the second case each player can additionaly observe the payoffs of his opponents.

We show that in both cases equilibria may fail to exist by presenting a two-player example for the first case and a three-player example for the second case. Both examples are absorbing games, namely there is only one non-trivial state.

Date received: May 31, 2000

Copyright © 2000 by the author(s). The author(s) of this document and the organizers of the conference have granted their consent to include this abstract in Atlas Conferences Inc. Document # cafc-75.