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First World Congress of the Game Theory Society (Games 2000)
July 24-28, 2000
Basque Country University and Fundacion B.B.V.
Bilbao, Spain

Organizers
Ehud Kalai, Federico Valenciano

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Quantity precommitment and dynamic price competition can yield the Bertrand outcome
by
Marc Dudey
Rice University

This paper shows how a duopolist's strategic incentive to restrict supply depends on the timing of consumer arrivals. I develop a model of quantity precommitment and dynamic price competition. Under reasonable conditions, the sellers do not restrict supply or earn positive profit.

Date received: June 19, 2000

Copyright © 2000 by the author(s). The author(s) of this document and the organizers of the conference have granted their consent to include this abstract in Atlas Conferences Inc. Document # cafk-11.