Atlas: Negotiation in Cooperative Bargaining Games with Restricted Communication by Balbina Casas-Mendez

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First World Congress of the Game Theory Society (Games 2000)
July 24-28, 2000
Basque Country University and Fundacion B.B.V.
Bilbao, Spain

Organizers
Ehud Kalai, Federico Valenciano

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Negotiation in Cooperative Bargaining Games with Restricted Communication
by
Balbina Casas-Méndez
Departamento de Estadística e IO. Universidad de Santiago de Compostela

From a bargaining game and a graph embodying the communication possibilities of the players, we define a non-cooperative game that describes the negotiation process. We propose the only subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome, of the non-cooperative game, as the solution for the initial bargaining game with restricted communication. We express this solution as a compromise value, study some of its properties, obtain characterization results and compare it numerically with other bargaining solutions. We note that, in absence of communication restrictions, our outcome provides a new solution concept for bargaining games. Finally, we compare our solution with the position value.

References:

Borm, P., Owen, G. and Tijs, S. (1992). On the position value for communication situations. SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics 5, 305-320.

Kalai, E. and Smorodinsky, M. (1975). Other solutions to Nash's bargaining problem. Econometrica 43, 513-518.

Moulin, H. (1984). Implementing the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution. Journal of Economic Theory 33, 32-45.

Myerson, R. (1977). Graphs and cooperation in games. Mathematics of Operations Research 2, 225-229.

Date received: June 20, 2000