Atlas: When are plurality rule voting games dominance solvable? by Amrita Dhillon

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First World Congress of the Game Theory Society (Games 2000)
July 24-28, 2000
Basque Country University and Fundacion B.B.V.
Bilbao, Spain

Organizers
Ehud Kalai, Federico Valenciano

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When are plurality rule voting games dominance solvable?
by
Amrita Dhillon
University of Warwick
Coauthors: Ben Lockwood (University of Warwick)

This paper studies the dominance solvability of plurality rule voting games. For K >= 3 alternatives and n >= 3 voters, we find sufficient conditions for the game to be dominance solvable (DS) and sufficient conditions for the game not to be dominance solvable. These conditions can be stated in terms of only one statistic of the game, the largest proportion of voters who agree on which alternative is worst on a sequence of subsets of the original set of alternatives.These conditions are asymptotically (with the number of players)necessary and sufficient. If the game is DS, a Condorcet Winner (CW) always exists when n >= 4 and the outcome is always the CW when the elecorate is sufficiently replicated.

Date received: June 28, 2000