Vote splitting, reelection and electoral control: a unified model
by
Mauricio S. Bugarin
Department of Economics, University of Brasilia

The literature on voting highlights two instruments of electoral control: vote splitting (Fiorina 1988, 1992, 1996; Alesina and Rosenthal 1989, 1995, 1996; Bugarin 1996) and reelection (Barro 1973; Ferejohn 1986). Although both instruments coexist in the real world elections, the current literature fails to analyze them in an integrated framework. The present article aims at filling this gap between economic modeling and empirical evidence, by presenting a game theoretic model of voters' behavior in which voters elect the Executive and the Legislature, choosing from candidates of different parties. Once elected, the Executive passes a budget from which he/she can extract ''political income'' in the form of overspending. The real economic cost associated to the budget is revealed only to the Executive and can take one of many values, depending on the state of the world. Passing an expensive budget in the Legislature is costly to the Executive; moreover, this cost is higher if the Executive incumbent's party does not hold the majority of seats. Voters decide the composition of the Legislature and the Executive in the first period, observe the outcome of the political bargaining process between the two powers, then decide whether to reelect the Executive and/or the Legislative representatives.

The model shows that voters' behavior is totally determined by their beliefs about the state of the world. If voters believe that the economy is in a good state, then only an Executive presenting a budget with a small amount of overspending will be reelected. Moreover, voters will split their ticket by choosing an Executive from a party and a majority in the Legislature from a different party. On the other hand, if voters believe that the economy is likely to be in a bad state, then an Executive passing a more expensive budget will be reelected and his/her party will be given majority in the Legislature.

The findings of the model confirm a puzzling observation. Indeed, on one hand, a country under severe crisis sometimes finds a hardly understandable political unity, whereas, on the other hand, voters may be strongly divided in their choices of Executive and Legislative representatives in a country experiencing a clear expansion path.

Cited references:

Alesina, A. and Rosenthal, H. (1989), Partisan cycles in congressional elections and the macroeconomy. American Political Science Review, 83: 373-398.

Alesina, A. and Rosenthal, H. (1995), Partisan politics, divided government and the economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Alesina, A. and Rosenthal, H. (1996), A theory of divided government. Econometrica, 64: 1311-1341.

Barro, R. The control of politicians: an economic model. Public Choice, 14:19-42, 1973.

Bugarin, M. Vote splitting as insurance against uncertainty. Public Choice, 98:153-169, 1999.

Ferejohn, J. Incumbent performance and electoral control. Public Choice, 50:5-26, 1986.

Fiorina, M. P. The reagan years: Turning to toward the right or groping toward the middle? In A. Kornberg & W. Mishler, eds., The Resurgence of Conservatism in Anglo-American Democracies. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1988.

Fiorina, M. P. An era of divided government. Political Science Quarterly, 107(3):387-410, 1992.

Fiorina, M. P. Divided Government, 2nd. ed. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

Date received: July 4, 2000

Copyright © 2000 by the author(s). The author(s) of this document and the organizers of the conference have granted their consent to include this abstract in Atlas Conferences Inc. Document # cafl-15.