Deontic logic and some calculations
by
Eduard Karavaev
Saint-Petersburg State University

There is a difference between the (ordinary) consistency of a set of propositions as such and the consistency of (moral) rules which compose a code. For when we say that norms are not consistent we mean that there are some circumstances when conjunction of their contents is not obtainable. Sometimes it has been suggested that all moral dilemmas result from such the consistency in moral rules. So they argued that by means of adding exception clauses to our principles currently in force or by giving priorities to some principles over others and so on we we can eliminate the possibility of dilemmas. So to say, even if we have not got the ideal code practically, nevertheless we can come nearer and nearer to it. But it seems that such the code is impossible not as a matter of fact but also as a matter of principle. For when we, in order to construct a system of priorities reduce deontical propositions to axilogical ones we will meet some difficulties. It is possible that, for example, three alternatives A, B and C which are compared relative to three factors are such ones that each of them is preferable than two others relative to two of the factors. Then we apparently cannot make a choice. It is possible to estimate the cases of such the impredicaments which were called "the Condorcet's effect". For example when we have got three alternatives the corresponding figure makes up approximately 6-9%.

Date received: March 1, 1999