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Parametrized Nash dynamics in two-person games
by
William Geller
Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis
Coauthors: Robert Becker (IU Bloomington, Economics)
Subir Chakrabarti (IUPUI, Economics)
Bruce Kitchens (IUPUI)
Michal Misiurewicz (IUPUI)
Nash's "better response" map prescribes updated strategies in a strategic game that modify current strategies to increase the probability of playing best responses to others' current strategies. Its fixed points coincide with the game's Nash equilibria. It can be naturally extended to a family of better response maps parametrized by an "index of caution." We study the dynamics of these maps and their dependence on the index of caution.
Date received: February 21, 2009
Copyright © 2009 by the author(s). The author(s) of this document and the organizers of the conference have granted their consent to include this abstract in Atlas Conferences Inc. Document # cayo-52.